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Switching the Default Rule
Cass R. Sunstein*
Abstract
There is a standard analysis of default rules in contract law, including those forms of
contract law that fall under the label of employment law. But behavioral economics raises many
complications. The default rule can create an endowment effect, making employees value certain
rights more simply because they have been granted such rights in the first instance. Similarly,
the default rule for savings plans, set by employers or law, seems to have a large effect on
employee behavior. When the default rule affects preferences and behavior, conventional
economic analysis seems indeterminate; either default rule can be efficient. In employment law,
analysis of distributive consequences also suggests the difficulty of deciding which default rule to
favor, because any switch in the rule is unlikely to have significant redistributive effects.
Nonetheless, switching the default rule can, in certain circumstances, have desirable effects on
workers’ welfare. A central question is whether the stickiness of the default rule reflects a
genuine change in values, or instead employee confusion or bargaining strategy.
I.

Introduction

A. Puzzles
Begin with three puzzles:
—Legislators in a Midwestern state want to give employees greater protection
against arbitrary discharges. But critics contend that a new law, flatly banning
discharges without cause, would be too rigid and would ultimately hurt
employees themselves. Some people have urged a compromise, one that would
give employees a right to be discharged only for cause unless they waive that
right through contract. Would the compromise have good effects? Would it have
any effects at all?

*
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—Employers in a large Midwestern state typically allow their employees to
participate in certain savings plans. Under the existing plans, employees can
elect to devote a specified level of their salary to savings, in return for tax relief
and some contribution from employers. But only about 20% of employees
participate in these plans. State legislators are considering a law that would
require an “automatic enrollment plan,” by which employees would be enrolled
in the plan when hired, but would be expressly authorized to opt out at the same
time. Would the new law have any effect on savings rates?
—There is no ban on age discrimination in a European country. Instead of
proposing a ban, legislators have urged that employees should have a
presumptive right to be free from age discrimination, but that employees should
be permitted to relinquish that right through voluntary agreements. Would
legislation to this effect be desirable? What would it accomplish?
In many areas of labor and employment law, it is possible to imagine two
different sorts of default rules. The employer might be presumed to have the relevant
entitlement, but the employee might be entitled to bargain for it. This is a system of
waivable employers’ rights. Alternatively, the employee might be presumed to have the
entitlement, but the employer might be entitled to bargain for it. This is a system of
waivable employees’ rights. The choice between the two cuts across many substantive
issues: job security, vacation time, parental leave, health care, savings plans, pensions,
occupational safety, even unionization itself. In these cases, and more, the legal system
might give the initial entitlement to one or another side. We could imagine a legal
system in which employers enjoy all or most initial entitlements; we could imagine
default rules granting all or most initial entitlements to employees.
At common law, employers are typically given almost all of the initial
entitlements. In that sense, the default rules set by the common law create a system of
waivable employers’ rights. Of course employees have a presumptive right to their own
time and labor; employers may assert a right to the time and labor of workers if and
only if the workers have bound themselves to work. But employees must specifically
bargain for everything else. When the contract is silent, an employer may discharge an
employee for any reason or for no reason at all; may refuse to provide vacation time,
parental leave, or health care; need not offer a safe workplace; need not provide a
pension plan; need not allow unionized workers on the premises.
Contrary to appearances, there is nothing natural or inevitable about this state of
affairs. When an employer is authorized to deny an employee a safe workplace, or
vacation time, and when there is no contractual provision on the point, the law has
made a choice about the (right) starting place for bargaining. It would be easy to
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imagine a legal system, fully committed to freedom of contract, that began with default
rules giving certain entitlements to employees. My principal questions in this essay are
simple: Would a switch of the entitlement matter? If so, exactly how?
B. Five Sets of Claims
Of course many statutes create nonwaivable rights. They bypass the question of
default rules entirely, by banning bargaining altogether. There are many reasons why
legislatures and courts might take this approach. Perhaps third party effects argue
against waiver. Perhaps waivers would be inadequately informed; behavioral
economics offers a number of reasons why this might be so.1 Perhaps nonwaivable
rights can be justified, in the context of accommodation mandates, on redistributive
grounds.2 But I seek here to cast light on a different question: When should employment
and labor law proceed, not by preventing bargaining, but by switching the relevant
entitlement from employers to employees?
Much attention has been paid to so switching entitlements; for example, freedom
from age discrimination now takes the form of a waivable workers’ right.3 Anecdotal
evidence suggests that people are often asked to waive race and sex discrimination
claims, though such waivers are most unlikely to be enforceable. Another example is
the Fair Labor Standards Act, which allows employees to waive their right not to work
more than forty hours a week, but also at a governmentally determined premium
(“time and a half”).4 Or consider the Model Employment Termination Act, which allows
employers and employees to waive the right to for cause discharge, but only on the
basis of an agreement by the employer to provide a severance agreement in the event of
a discharge not based on poor job performance.5
For purposes of the present discussion, let us put to one side those cases where
transactions costs impede bargaining. Everyone agrees that these are situations in
which the default rule will matter, and prove “sticky,” simply because it is costly to
contract around it.6 I will focus instead on cases in which there are no such transactions
costs. I urge, most generally, that in such cases, the default rule will matter, but that we
can find little guidance from the traditional criteria of efficiency and distribution. The
1

See Cass R. Sunstein, Human Behavior and the Law of Work, Va. L. Rev. (2001).
See Christine Jolls, Accommodation Mandates, Stan. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2001).
3
20 USC 626(f)(1).. Note that the right is waivable for past violations, not for future violations.
4
29 USC 207(f)
5
Model Employment Termination Act, Section 4©, reprinted in Mark Rothstein and Lance Liebman, Employment
Law 208-19 (Statutory Supplement) (1997),
6
For a much-cited discussion, see Ian Ayres and Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An
Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 Yale LJ 87 (1989).
2
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key questions are whether the switch of the entitlement genuinely changes values, as
opposed to bargaining strategies, and if so whether the switch improves workers’
welfare. In some cases, the switch in entitlement will indeed be defensible as a way of
making workers’ lives better. More particularly, I attempt to support the following sets
of points.
1. The switch of the entitlement might well make a difference simply by virtue of
the endowment effect – the effect of the initial allocation of the right on people’s
valuations, possibly employers and almost certainly workers.7 When the endowment
effect is at work, preferences and valuations are affected by the initial allocation of the
entitlement; contrary to the Coase theorem, there is no prelegal “preference” from
which the legal system can work. The default rule might matter because it has a
legitimating effect, carrying important information about what most people are
expected to do.8 If workers value a right more simply because it has been initially
allocated to them, and less because it has not been so allocated, a switch in the initial
allocation will matter by definition. The principal qualification here is that people might
be unaware of the legal rule. They might order their affairs on the basis of norms, rather
than law.9 If this is so, the switch in the entitlement is unlikely to matter.
2. A switch in default rules might be supported by traditional economic analysis
of “penalty defaults,” alongside a behaviorally informed understanding that employee
likely err about the law. Employees often lack information about their legal rights,
showing excessive optimism,10 and the switch of the entitlement from employers to
employees might increase the flow of information between the parties and to the legal
system.11 Suppose, for example, that if employees are given certain rights by the default
rule, employers will want to buy those rights. If this is the case, we will see a system in
which certain information is disclosed to employees, simply as part of the process by
7

See Richard Thaler, Quasi-Rational Economics 169, 184-86 (1993). The endowment effect might be small or
nonexistent for employers if legal entitlements are, for employers, akin to money tokens. See id. at 176. We would
not expect hardware stores to show an endowment effect for mousetraps and hammers; for hardware stores, these
goods are a form of cash. The question, not yet resolved, is whether legal entitlements have the same characteristic
for employers in the context of labor and employment law. Some evidence is provided in Jennifer Arlen, Matthew
Spitzer, and Eric Talley, forthcoming, with the finding that endowment effects are greatly reduced when agents are
acting for others. Id. Perhaps those acting for employers – such as supervisors and personnel officers -- are generally
“agents,” not subject to the endowment effect.
8
I will discuss this possibility in several places below; I believe that in some settings, it accounts for what is
described as an endowment effect, and perhaps should be described as a different effect from the endowment effect.
Social scientists have yet to sort out the relationship between this legitimating effect and the endowment effect, as
found in Daniel Kahneman, Jack Knetch, and Richard Thaler, Experimental Tests of the Endowment Effect and the
Coase Theorem, in Behavioral Law and Economics 211 (Cass R. Sunstein ed. 1999).
9
See Robert Ellickson, Order Without Law (1993).
10
See Richard Freeman and Joel Rogers, What Workers Want 118-22 (1999).
11
See Samuel Issacharoff, Contracting for Employment, 74 Tex L Rev 1783 (1994).
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which employers bargain. A switch in the legal rule, moving the initial allocation of the
entitlement from employer to employee, might give important information to workers
when they would otherwise overstate their legal rights.12
3. A default rule in favor of the employee might be undesirable if some cognitive
or motivational failure will lead the employee to demand an excessive amount in order
to trade. Suppose, for example, that employees would gain little from a contractual
right to be fired only for “just cause.” (Employees might have little to gain if discharges
rarely occur without cause; in that case, the contractual provision would give
employees a right that they enjoy in any event.) Suppose too that if employees are
initially given that right, they will not trade it, even for a high price. If this is so, a
switch in the entitlement, from employers to employees, would be hard to defend as a
way of improving the welfare of workers. Because employees would refuse to trade the
right, even though it does them little good, the result would be a situation in which
their overall compensation package is actually inferior.
4. In most circumstances, a switch in the default rule, or for that matter a refusal
to switch, will not be simple to justify on grounds of efficiency or redistribution. When
transactions costs are zero, either allocation will be efficient. From the standpoint of
redistribution, the effects are likely to be modest, at least as a general rule. The reason is
that the contractual setting will usually allow adjustments by employers, the apparent
“losers.”
5. What really matters is welfare, not efficiency; the latter is best understood as a
crude proxy for the former. A switch in the default rule might improve social welfare in
general and workers’ welfare in particular. Consider the second case given above,
where the switch might well increase savings without having any significant adverse
effect on workers. There is a related point: If workers care about relative economic
position, but not absolute economic position, a switch of the default rule to workers
might be justifiable on welfare grounds, because the switch might give the employees
real benefits while also not imposing real costs on them.
It is also possible that switching the default rule will have desirable effects on
norms and preferences, because it will inculcate a more appropriate sense of how, and
how much, to value the interests at stake. To those who object that this approach is
unacceptably paternalistic, the best response is simple: When the default rule has an
inevitable effect on valuation, there is no escaping issues of this kind, and it is hopeless
12

On workers’ ignorance of their legal rights, see Richard Freeman and Joel Rogers, What Workers Want 118-122
(1999).
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to attempt to “defer” to workers’ preferences – which are, by hypothesis, a function of
the legal rule. It is possible, however, that the endowment effect reflects no change in
welfare with different initial entitlements, but merely a difference in the bargaining
situation of employers and workers, and perhaps confusion about the existence of
opportunity costs.
The rest of the discussion will be devoted to an elaboration of these ideas.

II.

When the Default Rule Will Matter

According to the Coase theorem, a change in the default rule does not matter, at
least if there are no transactions costs.13 No matter the default rule, the parties will
bargain their way to a result that is both efficient and the same. It is obvious that this
claim has large implications for labor and employment law in particular. If the Coase
theorem is correct, the default rules set by the law, for workers and employers alike,
does not matter, at least if transactions costs are low. It is irrelevant whether employees
or employers are given initial rights with respect to leave time, vacation, health care, job
security, age discrimination, and more.
A. Workers’ Endowments: The Wrongness of the Coase Theorem
Of all existing claims in behavioral law and economics, perhaps the most wellknown is that on this point, the Coase theorem is entirely wrong.14 No one claims that
the Coase theorem is wrong insofar as it says that under the stated conditions, either
allocation of the entitlement will produce efficiency. Where the Coase theorem blunders
is in suggesting that no matter the initial allocation of the entitlement, people will
bargain to the same result. The reason that this is a blunder is that the initial allocation
seems to create an endowment effect.15 When the endowment effect is at work, those
who initially receive a legal right value it more than they would if the initial allocation
had given the right to someone else.

13

See Ronald Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, J. Law & Econ. (1961). It has long been acknowledged, however,
that wealth effects may mean that the initial entitlement will affect ultimate outcomes. See Richard A. Posner,
Economic Analysis of Law 51 (5th ed. 1999). But wealth effects are generally thought to be small. See infra. The
traditional analysis ignores the endowment effect. See id.
14
See Daniel Kahneman, Jack Knetch, and Richard Thaler, Experimental Tests of the Endowment Effect and the
Coase Theorem, in Behavioral Law and Economics 211 (Cass R. Sunstein ed. 1999).
15
See Thaler, supra note.
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There is a great deal of evidence to this effect.16 One of the initial studies involved
the effect of the initial allocation of mugs and chocolate bars.17 Here the endowment
effect was found to be instantaneous: People initially allocated the relevant good
demanded a great deal more to sell it than people not initially allocated the good were
willing to pay to obtain it. Countless studies have found a disparity between
willingness to pay (for a good owned by someone) else and willingness to accept
(payment for a good already owned).18 Some of these studies have shown an
endowment effect in a contractual setting, akin to that involved in labor and
employment law.19 As I have suggested, the default rule might matter, not because of a
“pure” endowment effect, but because it carries information about what most people
do, or about what it is most reasonable to do. In this event too, the default rule can have
significant consequences.
In the context of insurance, an unplanned, natural experiment showed that the
default rule can be very “sticky.”20 New Jersey created a system in which the default
insurance program for motorists included a relatively low premium and no right to sue;
purchasers were allowed to deviate from the default program and to purchase the right
to sue by choosing a program with that right and also a higher premium. By contrast,
Philadelphia offered a default program containing a full right to sue and a relatively
high premium; purchasers could elect to switch to a new plan by “selling” the more
ample right to sue and paying a lower premium. In both cases, the default rule tended
to stick. A strong majority accepted the default rule in both states, with only about 20%
of New Jersey drivers acquiring the full right to sue, and 75% of Pennsylvanians
retaining that right. Experiments confirm the basic effect, showing that the value of the
right to sue is much higher when it is presented as part of the default package.21
It is not clear that the difference reflects an endowment effect, involving a
change in valuation as a result of the initial entitlement. But it does demonstrate a large
consequence from a change in the default rule. It seems reasonable to speculate that in
many cases, the default rule carries information about what ordinary or sensible
practice.22 This too is a central reason that the default rule can matter.

16

See, e.g, Russell Korobkin, Behavioral Economics, Contract Formation, and Contract Law, in Behavioral Law
and Economcis, supra, at 311.
17
See Kahneman, Knetch, and Thaler, supra.
18
For citations, see Thaler, supra note, at 168.
19
See Korobkin, supra, in Behavioral Law and Economics.
20
See Colin Camerer, Prospect Theory in the Wild, in Choices, Values, and Frames 294-95 (Daniel Kahneman and
Amos Tversky eds. 2000); Eric Johnson et al., Framing, Probability Distortions, and Insurance Decisions, in id. at
224, 238.
21
Id. at 235-38.
22
See below.
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From all this we might reach a simple conclusion: When labor and employment
sets a default rule, it is likely to prove “sticky,” because of its effect on employees’
judgments and valuations. If there is a default rule against age discrimination, the
ultimate outcome will be quite different from that produced by a default rule
permitting age discrimination. If a default rule creates a right to a generous pension
program, the outcome will differ from that produced by a default rule creating no such
right. In fact the default rule selected by employers will matter no less than that set by
law. I now turn to an example.
B. Private Default Packages and the Case of Savings
Some people think that workers do not save enough for retirement. Without
arguing the point, let us simply suppose, for purposes of argument, that they are right.
Might employees’ failure to save be a function of the default rule? Might a change in the
default rule alter savings rates? The evidence seems clear. A mere change in the default
rule will dramatically alter employee behavior 23 – probably because in some contexts,
the default rule carries information about the ordinary and sensible course of action.
Whatever the mechanism, the default rule has significant consequences for employee
behavior. Note that the issue here involves an employer’s decision, not about whether
the employer or employee should enjoy an entitlement, but about the default rule
governing the allocation of workers’ benefits between salary and retirement savings.
An important study has demonstrated the basic effect.24 For some years,
employees would not be enrolled in a 401(k) plan unless they affirmatively chose to do
so. The employer instituted a change by which employees would be automatically
enrolled, and would be removed from the program only if they so chose. The change in
the default option had dramatic effects. When employees had 3-15 months of tenure,
the participation rate was 37% under the old plan; under the new plan, the participation
rate, for those with the same amount of tenure, was no less than 86% for employees
with that amount of tenure. Automatic enrollment had especially pronounced effects on
the participation rates of women and African-Americans.
In a separate phenomenon, the default rule also had a significant effect on the
chosen contribution rate. The default contribution rate (3%) tended to stick; a majority
of employees maintained that rate even though this particular rate was chosen by less
than 1% of employees hired before the automatic enrollment. The same result was
found for the default allocation of the investment: While less than 1% of employees
23

B.C. Madrian and D. Shear, The Power of Suggestion: An Analysis of 401(k) Participation and Savings Behavior,
available on SSRN.com.
24
Id.
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chose a 100% investment allocation to the money market fund, a substantial majority of
employees chose that allocation when it was the default rule.
As I have suggested, the significant effect from the default rule is probably a
product of its informational signal. With respect to savings, the initially proposed plan
carries a certain legitimacy, perhaps because it seems to have resulted from some
conscious thought about what makes most sense for most people. This understanding is
supported by the finding that the largest effects, from the new default rule, are shown
by women and African-Americans. We might speculate that members of such groups
tend to be less confident in their judgments in this domain and to have less experience
in assessing different savings plans.25
Richard Thaler and Schlomo Benartzi have exploited the endowment effect and
loss aversion to propose a new plan, Save More Tomorrow, designed to increase
savings by workers.26 The authors’ suggestion is that employers should offer employees
the option to choose a retirement plan that favors savings. Under the Save More
Tomorrow plan, employees are invited to join a plan in which they can to precommit to
give a certain amount of their future salary increases to be used in their retirement
savings. The rationale behind the proposal is that while people would be reluctant to
give some of their current salary to savings (because they would then suffer a loss), they
would be willing to give some of their future salary increases to savings (because they
would then remain “gainers” after the increase). Would this plan have any effect?
Thaler and Benartzi found a dramatic impact. A company that adopted the plan found
that the plan was chosen by over three-quarters of those offered it; that almost all of
those who adopted it remained in it; and that the consequence of the plan was to
increase average savings rates of those enrolled in the plan from 3.5% to 9.4% over
sixteen months. Significantly, only a tiny portion of those who joined the plan (less than
3%) dropped out after two pay increases.
The studies that I have just described show significant effects from changes in the
default option – but these changes are produced by employers, not by law. Understood
in this narrow form, the point itself carries considerable importance. It suggests that
voluntary behavior by employers, perhaps in concert with unions, can greatly affect
employees, not by mandating any particular course, but by suggesting a default
option.27 Employers, acting together with employees, might design any number of
25

I am grateful to Christine Jolls for pressing this point.
See Richard Thaler and Schlomo Benartzi, Save More Tomorrow: An Easy Way to Increase Employee Savings
(unpublished manuscrupt July 2000)
27
The point might help to explain the finding in Freeman and Rogers, supra note, that workers in unionized firms
are almost unanimously satisfied with their union and would not like a change. For most of these workers,
26
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default compensation packages, giving employees some mixture of take-home pay,
vacation time, pension plan, job security, and protection from discrimination. What we
now know is that the default plan will have significant behavioral consequences.
Perhaps it will be thought that any suggested default plan would represent an
objectionable interference with workers’ freedom of choice. But because any default
option is likely to stick, this objection is implausible.28 A sensible approach for the future
would involve consultations between employers and groups of workers, not to
mandate any particular outcome, but to identify default rules that are likely to be in the
interest of most workers. Since any such default rule will not work well for everyone,
there should be an opportunity, in ordinary circumstances, for workers to opt out if
they wish.
The point has implications for law as well. With respect to savings, it is easy to
imagine a statutory intervention designed not to mandate anything in particular, but to
ensure a particular default rule. Employers might be encouraged (through information
or economic incentives) or required to propose a certain savings package for employees,
while at the same time allowing employees to divert some of the money to salary if they
wish. Perhaps a statutory program to this effect could build on the “Save More
Tomorrow” plan. It is even possible to imagine a system of social security reform that
would make creative use of default rules to offer workers starting points that would be
most likely to improve their welfare.
C. General Lessons
The domain of savings might reflect an unusually loud informational signal, but
we know enough to know that the initial entitlement is likely to have large
consequences.29 To the extent that large effects can be expended from a change in the
default rule, there is a general lesson for labor law. If employees are given a waivable
right to be fired only for cause, to take vacation leave, to have a certain level of
occupational safety, or to be free from age discrimination, they are likely to value that
right more than they would if the right were allocated to employers in the first instance.
The conclusion is that if a default rule is switched, so that entitlements initially enjoyed

unionization has become the default option. Of course we cannot know the extent to which workers’ satisfaction is
the product of this effect, or whether workers who have voted for a union are likely to like unions.
28
See Thaler and Benartzi, supra.
29
See Russell Korobkin, Behavioral Economics, Contract Formation, and Contract Law, in Behavioral Law and
Economics 116 (Cass R. Sunstein ed. 2000); Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics,
in id. at 13, 30 (discussing study by Jonathan Gruber).
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by employers are now owned by employees, the outcome would not be the same. Very
generally, the entitlement will have a tendency to stick.
But there is an important qualification. The default rule might not matter for a
reason unrelated to the Coase theorem: People might not know about the default rule,
and they might not order their affairs by reference to it. Suppose, for example, that
workers and employers decide on job security, or vacation time, or pension plans,
without reference to the legal rule. Robert Ellickson has shown, in some domains, that it
is a mistake to be “lawcentric”; people might well produce outcomes with little
reference to legal rules.30 Norms, not traceable to law, may do the work of law. To the
extent that this is so, switching the default rule will have no impact, because people do
not enter into agreements with anything like close reference to it.
Is this likely to be the case in most domains of labor and employment law? No
general answer would make sense. But in the area of labor-management relations,
employers, at least, are likely to know about the nature of the governing default rules,
and they are likely to act on the basis of that understanding, If law confers initial
entitlements on employees, employers are likely to know about the fact, and to respond.
Perhaps this step will not be necessary if employers know that employees are unaware
of what the law has done; in that case, employers will have little to worry about in the
event that they do not “buy back” the relevant right. But a sensible employer is unlikely
to be willing to take his chances with employee ignorance. I now turn to the resulting
questions.
III. Default Rules and Information Flow
The simplest effect of switching the default rule will therefore be to increase the
likelihood that it will end up where it was initially placed. If workers are initially given
certain rights or options, those rights or options will tend to stick. But what will be the
consequence for bargaining in the labor market? A potential result – for labor and
employment law, a fortunate one -- will be to ensure that more information is disclosed
to workers who might otherwise have overestimated their legal rights, and also to the
legal system.31 In particular, a switch of entitlement from employer to employee will
increase the likelihood that workers will know what the law has and has not given
them, and bargain accordingly. The optimistic view would that a switch of that sort
might even overcome a market failure, in the form of inadequate information on the
part of employees. When the employer is given the initial entitlement, bargains might
30
31

See Robert Ellickson, Order Without Law (1991).
This is a large theme in the law of contract, see Ayres and Gertner, supra note.
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not represent anything like a meeting of the minds. A switch of the default rule can
solve the problem.
In one sense, this point is entirely old hat. It is well known that default rules can
operate as “penalties” that impose the burden of disclosure on those who have it, for
the benefit of those who need it.32 But the point has not been greatly discussed in the
context of labor and employment law.33 What I add here is a behavioral suggestion: For
as yet ill-understood reasons,, workers frequently, and generally, have a false and
exaggerated understanding of their legal rights. It is for this reason that switching the
entitlement for employers to employees might be especially desirable, as a means of
correcting employee ignorance.
To see why this is so, imagine a situation, by itself apparently unproblematic, in
which the right is initially vested in employers, and it rarely happens that employees
bargain for that right. It might be, for example, that employers have a right to fire
employees at will, or to replace strikers permanently, or to deny employees parental
leave, occupational safety, or freedom from age discrimination. If the entitlement tends
to stay where it was initially allocated, the reason might be (a) significant transactions
costs, (b) little employee enthusiasm for purchasing the right at the market price, (c) an
endowment effect, or (d) an employees’ failure to know that they do not have the right
in any case. Reason (a) and (b) can be analyzed conventionally. If transactions costs are
high, a central efficiency question is whether the default rule “mimics the market,” in
the sense it reflects what the parties would have done if they had bargained.34 If
employees do not attempt to purchase the right at market price, there seems to be no
problem from the standpoint of efficiency, though perhaps there is some other reason
for concern.35 I have just discussed the endowment effect. For present purposes, the
interesting case is (d) – employee ignorance about the content of the default rule.
There is growing evidence that workers overestimate their legal rights – a
phenomenon that we might label the “fairness heuristic,” by which employees bleive
that the law is what (they think) fair law would be. For example, Pauline Kim has
shown that employees generally believe that the legal rule is one of “for cause rather
than “at will” – that, in other words, employees can be fired only for cause.36 Of course
32

See id.
The leading exception is Samuel Issacharoff, Contracting for Employment, 74 Tex L Rev 1783 (1994), from
which I have learned a great deal. The point is also treated in Pauline Kim, Norms, Learning, and Law, 1999 Univ of
Ill L Rev 447.
34
This oversimplifies some complex issues. See Ayres and Gertner, supra.
35
There is a possibility of uninformed or otherwise objectionable preferences, discussed below.
36
Pauline Kim, Norms, Learning, and Law, 1999 Univ of Ill L Rev 447; Pauline Kim, Bargaining With Imperfect
Information: A Study of Worker Perceptions of Legal Protection in an At-Will World, 83 Cornell L Rev 105 (1997);
33
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employees are wrong on this point; without a contractual provision giving them job
security, they do not, in fact, have a right not to be discharged “at will.” On this point
employees systematically err; they think that they have a right that they lack. Richard
Freeman and Joel Rogers have greatly generalized this finding, showing that workers
believe that they have a number of rights that they in fact lack.37 Workers believe, for
example, that employers cannot hire permanent replacements for strikers; that
employers cannot require employees to do dangerous work; that workers have ample
rights against arbitrary discharge.38
These findings do not establish that employees should be given a right to job
security or to anything else. But they do appear to establish an apparently serious
problem with the current situation, in the form of pervasive worker overestimation of
their legal rights.39 To be sure, it is possible that this is not a reason for special concern,
at least if workers are speaking for employer’s ordinary practices (as seems plausible in
the context of job security). If employees have the law wrong but the practices right, the
problem is not so troublesome. But something does seem to be amiss if workers believe
that they have legal rights that they lack as a matter of law. An obvious remedy would
be to switch the default rule, not to ensure that employees have job security and so
forth, but to ensure that whatever they have, it is a product of informed bargai ning.
Here the likely consequence of a switch in the default rule, giving employees a right (for
example) to be fired only for cause, would be to ensure that employers would buy the
right via contract if that is where, on conventional grounds, the right belongs.40 And if
the idea is sound, it might be applied in many other areas in which employees
erroneously believe that they have certain legal rights.
Nor is this idea entirely foreign to labor and employment law. State courts have
made significant inroads on the at will rule, by taking ambiguous “promises” from
employers as a basis for creating a right to job security.41 A possible understanding of
these cases is close to what I have suggested here: Employees should not be unaware of
their rights, and doctrines should be developed to ensure that when they are entering
into employment contracts, they are aware of what they do and do not have. With a
doctrine that takes ambiguous statements, apparently promising job security, as a basis
for rights of job security, it is possible to give employers a good incentive to tell
employees exactly where they stand. In fact employers in Michigan have done exactly
37

See Freeman and Rogers, What Workers Want (1999).
Id. at 118-121.
39
See id.
40
See Issacharoff, supra note.
41
See, eg, Touissant v. Blue Cross, 408 Mich 579 (1980); McDonald v., Mobil Coal, 820 P. 2d 986, 987 (1991). For
an overview, see Mark Rothstein et al., Employment Law 530-32 (1994).
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this – responding to the cases by giving employees a clear signal that they lack job
security. The advantage of this approach is that it promotes a better information flow
between the parties, so that workers are more likely to know what they are (not)
getting.42
Of course an understanding of behavioral economics raises many questions
about allowing waiver at all.43 Perhaps employees will be unaware of what it is that
they are waiving. Perhaps they will think that they have the relevant rights even after
wiaver. Perhaps they will engage in wishful thinking. But at the very least, a switch of
the default rule will increase the information that is provided to employees – and that
probably counts as a good thing.
IV. Default Rules and Cognitive or Motivational Failure
For those concerned about improving the welfare of employees, it seems to make
sense to create default rules that favor workers. If what matters is the welfare of
workers, shouldn’t workers be given certain rights, with the proviso that employers
might be able to buy them if workers find the bargain to be worthwhile?
In general, the implication of the question is not entirely wrong (see section V).
But there is an important qualification. Suppose that a significant endowment effect
accompanies the switch of the default rule. Suppose too that employees are extremely
reluctant to trade the relevant right, so much so that employers are infrequently willing
to offer enough to produce a trade. At first glance, nothing seems amiss; the entitlement
should stay where it was initially allocated, because employees value it more than
employers do (given that initial allocation).
But here we can find another twist from behavioral economics: Some employees
might refuse to waive because of cognitive and motivational problems. Suppose, for
example, that most workers have little to gain from a right to be fired only for cause,
because in a market economy, such workers are not really at risk.44 Why would an
employer fire someone without cause? In that event, it should be expected that workers
would be willing to waive for a relatively low price. But at least it is possible that
workers will refuse to do so, simply because they “overvalue” the right, and hence will
42

There is, however, a possible disadvantage: Employees might not really be getting anything they don’t really
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believe in the legal effectiveness of a waiver. See Kim, supra.
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See Sunstein, supra note.
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not sell except for a price that is too high, from the standpoint of their own welfare.
Workers might, for example, overestimate the probability that the small risk will come
to fruition, perhaps because they can think of a salient example.45 We do not have the
empirical work that would justify an unequivocal view on this issue. But we know
enough to know that the risk is real.
The cautionary lesson here is that concern about workers’ waivers is a doubleedged sword. In some circumstances, that concern justifies the creation of nonwaivable
workers’ rights.46 But in some circumstances, the same concern justifies a system of
waivable employers’ rights, on the theory that a default rule in favor of workers might
jeopardize workers’ own welfare.
V. Which Default Rule? Efficiency, Distribution, and Welfare
The largest question remains. In the presence of an endowment effect, or some
other stickiness in the initial entitlement, which default rule is best? To answer this
question, it is necessary to identify the criteria by which to answer that question.
A. Efficiency
On a familiar view, the default rule should be chosen by the efficiency criterion.
The question is which default rule will promote efficiency – the standard claim in the
economic analysis of law.47
To be sure, no sensible person would contend that efficiency is the only thing
that labor and employment law should be concerned with. Few people, however,
would deny that an efficiency loss is at least relevant to the inquiry, because it is
relevant to the welfare of workers and everyone else.48 But there is a serious problem in
using the efficiency criterion to choose among default rules (when transactions costs are
zero). If the endowment effect is at work, the two results are different, but they will
both be efficient. If an employee refuses to trade a right to be free from age
discrimination except at a very high price, and if employers will not offer that price, the
outcome – no trade – is efficient. If an employee is not willing to buy a right to be free
from age discrimination, and if employers will not sell that right except at a very high
price, the outcome – no trade – is also efficient. In the presence of an endowment effect,
the efficiency criterion is indeterminate and therefore unhelpful.
45
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To be sure, familiar economic analysis can suggest a default rule in the face of
transactions costs, by seeing whether one or another rule “mimics the market” by
replicating the likely outcome of bargaining, or this inquiry proves difficult, by
choosing a penalty that produces clarity from the parties.49 But if there are no
transactions costs, and if different default rules produce different but efficient
outcomes, economic analysis has little to say about how to choose among the competing
possible rules.
The point can be clarified with a simple example. Suppose that most employees
would be willing to purchase a right to job security for $200. Suppose that most
employers would be willing to sell it for $250. In these circumstances, most contracts
will be at will; this is the efficient outcome. But suppose that if employees are initially
given the right, they will trade it only for $300 – and that in the same circumstances,
most employers (showing o endowment effect) would be willing to buy it for $250. In
these circumstances, most contracts will be for cause. Two different outcomes are
efficient, and they are different only because of the difference in the initial allocation of
the entitlement.
At this stage the efficiency criterion seems indeterminate. For the moment, we
should note that willingness to pay (WTP) and willingness to accept (WTA) are
important only insofar as they provide administrable indications of the welfare gain
from a trade. When the endowment effect means that WTP and WTA are different,
there are two interesting possibilities. First, the difference might measure actual welfare
differences, depending on the default rule. Second, the difference between WTP and
WTA might have nothing to do with welfare at all; it might be produced by confusion,
by bargaining behavior, or something else not directly related to workers’ welfare
under different default rules. I will return to the problem shortly.
B. Distribution
Might some progress be made by asking about distribution? Suppose that there
is a general view that in cases of doubt, the law should distribute resources to
employees rather than employers. Certainly the impetus for much of labor law has been
to transfer resources in this way.
To be sure, it is not clear that this view makes sense, even for those who favor
more egalitarian distributions. Many employees are not poor; many poor people are not
49

See Ayres and Gerner, supra note.
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employees; and efforts to redistribute resources from employers to employees are not
the same as efforts to redistribute directly from rich to poor. In any case the effect of
those efforts may be to increase prices, which is hardly good for poor people. Increased
prices are a kind of regressive tax; they are especially hard on the poor. A progressive
income tax is far more likely to be an effective method of redistributing income than
employment and labor law.50 But at least it is possible to favor a transfer of resources
from employers to employees -- perhaps on the ground that workers as such receive too
little of the proceeds from work, perhaps with the thought that anything that distributes
resources from employers to employees will tend to increase equality in the distribution
of income. If these thoughts turn out to be wrong, we might be able to venture more
targeted regulations that have the desired effect.
At first glance, there does seem to be a plausible argument, on grounds of
redistribution, for switching entitlements from employers to employees, regardless of
the extent of the endowment effect. Employee wealth would appear to be increased by a
decision allocating entitlements to employees rather than employers. Suppose, for
example, that employees are suddenly given a right to participate in all company
decisions – a right that employers can buy for a fee.51 At least for current employees, the
new entitlement should have significant redistributive effects, because employers are
likely to be required to, and to be willing to pay. a good deal to reclaim the right. If,
then, the entitlement is quite valuable, the shift from employer to employee should, at
first glance, have substantial redistributive consequences. The extent of the consequence
depends on the value of the entitlement.
But in the contractual setting that typifies labor and employment law, things are
far more complicated than that,52 and far less promising for those who seek to promote
redistribution through switching the entitlement. If employees are given an entitlement,
whether alienable or inalienable, the rest of the contractual package might well be
adjusted accordingly. A right to participate in company decisions, if not traded, will be
met with some kind of market response – through, for example, higher prices, less
employment, or lower wages. As a result of the enactment of workers’ compensation
and parental leave programs, for example, many workers lost almost as much in wages
as they gained in the relevant rights.53 In the context of protection against discrimination
50
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on the basis of disability, employers appeared to respond not by cutting wages but by
decreasing hiring of disabled people.54
From the standpoint of redistribution, the question for labor and employment
law is the incidence of the cost, faced only initially by employers, of the switched
entitlement. There is a growing body of work, both theoretical and empirical, on the
distributional consequence of mandatory terms,55 and the issues are not altogether
different for switched default rules. A grossly simplified overview: The central
questions involve (a) the responsiveness of consumers to price increases, (b) the
responsiveness of prospective and current workers to wage decreases, and (c) the cost,
to employers, of reducing the number of workers. If the cheapest response to higher
costs, for employers, is to raise prices, that is what they will do; if the cheapest response
is to cut wages or decrease the number of employees, they will choose that route. In the
employment context, no general prediction makes sense.56 But there is a significant risk
that any redistributive gain will be nullified, at least in part, through readjustment of
the wage package. On plausible assumptions, workers will lose, in wages, some or
much of what they gain as a result of the switched entitlement.57
This does not mean that a switch cannot be justified on distributive grounds.
Workers’ compensation programs, for example, seem to have produced distributive
gains in the unionized sector, by giving workers a benefit that was not offset by wage
cuts.58 But there is no reason for great confidence, in the abstract, that there will be a
significant distributive gain from the switch. If this is true for nonwaivable rights, it is
true too for waivable rights, many of which will be waived, with no significant
distributional shifts.
In the standard analysis of mandates directed to workers as a whole,59
distributive gains and efficiency gains march hand-in-hand; without efficiency gains,
there can be no efficiency gains. Because of the empirical considerations just discussed, I
think that this claim is too simple: It is imaginable that workers will benefit, on balance,
from an inefficient mandate. But even if this is right, the claim that a switch in
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entitlements will make for distributional improvements is quite fragile, with the
exception of accommodation mandates, on which I am not focussing here.60
C. Welfare
Sensible conclusions, from what has been said thus far, are that (a) a switch of the
entitlement will be neither good nor bad on efficiency grounds, and (b) the switch
might possibly be justified on redistributive grounds, but this depends on a complex
inquiry into the incidence of the burden represented by these greater costs. Is there any
other way to resolve the problem?
In theory, at least, it is worthwhile to ask whether the aggregate welfare of
employers and employees is improved with one or another default rule. I have noted
that “efficiency,” as understood through the criterion of willingness to pay (or
willingness to accept) is at best a proxy for welfare, suitable for guiding policy only
because it provides an administrable, though quite crude, way of inquiring into welfare
consequences.61 If the efficiency calculus proves unhelpful, perhaps we should avoid the
middleman and go to welfare directly. If the difference between WTP and WTA has
nothing to do with a difference in welfare, we have reason to think that a switch in the
entitlement will matter neither to efficiency nor to welfare. If a new default rule would
give the winners more than the losers lose, it will be justified on welfare grounds,
endowment effect or no endowment effect. The most serious difficulty here is that the
legal system lacks direct access to welfare consequences, and in this setting, the normal
proxies are unreliable.62
1. Savings. To make the analysis tractable, begin with the relatively easy case of
savings. If a default rule increases savings, and if the increase improves workers’
welfare, the case for a pro-savings default rule seems extremely plausible. Suppose, for
example, that workers lose little or nothing from the reduction in take-home pay but
that they gain significantly from the increase in savings. If so, and if employers lose
nothing, the switch seems easily defensible on welfare grounds.
What I am suggesting here is that with the suggested default rule, workers will
be better off, because they will accumulate more in the way of savings, and because
they will not much suffer, in terms of welfare, from the somewhat lower weekly takehome pay. Of course some workers will be somewhat worse off with a reduction in
take-home pay, and for some, that welfare loss will not be overcome by the increase in
60
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savings. And at some point, a transfer of money from salary to savings would certainly
hurt most or all employees. But we are speaking here only of a default rule, allowing
workers to opt out; and for the small salary reductions involved here, automatic
enrollment plans, suggested by employers or mandated by law, seem substantial
improvements.
2. Welfare, utility, and relative position. But many of the cases that I have
discussed are far more complicated. If we had direct access to the welfare of employers
and employers, we might be able to make choices on grounds of welfare. Of course the
idea of “welfare” can be specified in many different ways.63 To simplify matters, let us
assume, without insisting the point, that “utility” is what is most important. Might one
or another default rule increase utility? This is certainly possible. After a switch,
aggregate utility might be increased, perhaps because employees gain more than
employers lose. Suppose, for example, that employees’ utility is far higher if they have
a right to job security, or parental leave, or paid vacations; suppose too that the utility
loss (because of costs faced initially by employers, with the accompanying incidence of
those costs) is not very high. If this is so, the argument for the switch seems quite
plausible.
In pointing to the importance of relative (as opposed to absolute) economic
position, some people have made an argument of just this sort on behalf of mandatory
terms in employment contracts.64 The argument is that mandatory terms can improve
workers’ welfare if they give workers an important good (such as improved safety or
increased leisure time) while diminishing absolute, but not relative, income. A shift of
this kind would improve workers’ income if the reduction in absolute income does not
really reduce workers’ welfare and if the new good leads, for all or most workers, to a
welfare improvement.
If it is correct, this argument is based on reasonable claims about what really
promotes workers’ welfare. Some such claims might also be reasonable in the context of
a switch in the default rule, especially, but not only, if relative economic position is
what matters to workers. If relative position is what matters, the switch in the default
rule might turn out to be a special case of the argument just given: Any income loss will
not matter much, because relative position will be held constant, and relative position is
what matters. If relative position is not what matters, it is nonetheless possible that
63
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employee welfare will be improved after the switch. The problem is that the legal
system is likely to lack the tools to know whether this is so. One possible avenue for
inquiry would involve objective indicators of welfare – suicide attempts, health,
longevity65 – but of course it will be most difficult, in this context, to control for
confounding variables.
3. Sources of the endowment effect. Another possibility would be to inquire into
the basis for the endowment effect in the particular case. If we know why the
endowment effect exists, we might be able to make some progress in deciding on the
default rule. In asking about whether to use “willingness to pay” or instead
“willingness to accept,” some progress has been made on this question.66 Suppose, for
example, that willingness to pay is lower than willingness to accept because of wealth
effects: Willingness to pay is constrained by existing holdings, as willingness to accept
is not. If this is so, we might choose willingness to accept, on the ground that it is a
more accurate measure of the value of the good in question.67 But there is a serious
problem with this argument: The difference between WTP and WTA might have
nothing to do with a general wealth effect, as demonstrated by the fact that it has been
observed in many contexts lacking significant wealth effects.68 When workers demand
more for an entitlement than they would be willing to pay for it, the reason need not be
the wealth effects of the default rule.
What, then, accounts for the endowment effect? The question has no obvious
answer.69 It might be that the effect is “hard-wired”; it might be a fact of human
psychology that more is demanded to relinquish ownership of X than to obtain X in the
first instance.70 Or perhaps the endowment effect has to do, not with the higher actual
value of things owned, but with the some asymmetry in anticipated after-the-fact
regret. People might fear that they would regret a change from the existing rule, and
this bias in anticipated regret might play a role in creating the endowment effect.
Perhaps people, and workers in particular, believe that the initial allocation of the
entitlement carries a certain moral weight, or presumptive validity, so much so as to
drive a wedge between WTP and WTA. In some circumstances, selling a good might be
appear illegitimate, an insult to dignity.71 Or perhaps some people simply ignore, much
of the time, the existence of opportunity costs.72 For goods that are not simply money
65
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tokens, people appear to think that continued ownership is costless, or that the cost of
not selling is far less than it is in effect. This might well be simple confusion. If there is
the source of the endowment effect, we should not use WTA, and there is no good
reason to switch the default rule.
Perhaps a better understanding of the source of the endowment effect could help
us to know whether the default rule should be switched on welfare grounds. One thing
that we would like to know is whether the difference between WTP and WTA, in the
context of labor law, reflects real welfare or utility differences between different states
of affairs, or is instead an artifact of the bargaining situation and confusion about
opportunity costs. I suspect that in many contexts, bargaining considerations, alongside
that confusion, are responsible; the mugs and chocolates experiments seem to support
that conclusion. If this is so, WTP is better than WTA, because the higher amount
represented by WTA does not really mean that people’s utility will be higher as a result
of having the initial allocation. And if this is so, the existence of an effect, from the
initial entitlement, does not argue for shifting the entitlement to workers.
D. Preferences and Value Formation
More controversially, we might think that people’s lives will simply be better if
the endowment effect pushes valuation in one direction rather than another. To make
the point vividly, suppose that a legal system is considering whether to give employees
a presumptive right to be free from sexual harassment, or instead to say that employers
can engage in sexual harassment unless employees can buy a right to be free from it. It
is easy to imagine that if employees are given that presumptive right, they will be most
reluctant to give it up. They would demand a high premium for the right not to be
subject to (some probability of) sexual harassment; they might even refuse the trade that
right even for a large fee. The clear implication is that workers will value the right to be
free from sexual harassment more highly if they have an initial right to that freedom. If
it is believed that the higher valuation of that right is better, then a right, in employees,
might well be best. It is even possible to think, on this ground, that the right should be
inalienable.73 But short of accepting this conclusion, a shift of the right from employer
to employee might well be best.
It is possible to object that an inquiry of this kind is unacceptably partisan – that
it takes a stand on appropriate preferences and values. But this is a weak objection.74 If
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the endowment effect is at work, there is no avoiding a legal effect on workers’
preferences. Whatever the content of the legal rule, preferences will be affected (if there
is an endowment effect). A preference-shaping effect, from the default rule, is
inevitable. If this is so, a sensible question is how labor and employment law might
create a preferable system of values. To be sure, it is not easy to answer that question,
not least because it raises normative issues on which reasonable people will differ. But
let me begin with some controversial suggestions: It would be highly desirable if
workers placed a very high premium on ensuring that workplaces are safe; in spending
time with young children, with relatives who are sick, and with their families; and in
making decent provision for retirement. To the extent that default rules will increase
workers’ interests in these goods, a switch in the default rule, by employers or by law,
would be a good idea.
Conclusion
In this Essay I have explored the possibility of producing labor law reform
through a simple step: Switch the default rule. More particularly, labor law reform
might promote a situation in which workers, rather than employers, have more
presumptive rights, to be tradeable only through voluntary bargaining.
Echoing the emerging orthodoxy in behavioral law and economics, I have argued
that the default rule might well matter. If the legal rule has an endowment effect, it is
potentially important to ultimate outcomes, even in the absence of transactions costs.
The principal qualification here is that in some domains, workers and employers might
order their affairs with little or no reference to legal rules. To the extent that this is so, a
switch in the default rule should not matter; but usually this will not be so. I have also
urged that a switch in the default rule, to an initial allocation in favor of employees,
might have the fortunate result of ensuring that important information is disclosed to
employees – a corrective to what seems to be a “fairness heuristic” by which people
identify likely legal rules. By itself this is an argument in favor of the switch.
I have also urged that considerations of efficiency and distribution are unlikely to
argue strongly in favor of maintaining or switching the default rule. If transactions costs
are zero, the outcome will be efficient, no matter the initial allocation. If the endowment
effect is at work, the outcome will not be the same; but it will be efficient. At first glance,
the efficiency criterion therefore seems indeterminate. As a distributional matter, a
grant of entitlements to employees might make employees somewhat wealthier. But
entrepreneurship, and indifference to certain ascriptive characteristics. See Albert Hirschmann, The Passions and the
Interests (19d).
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market readjusments will ultimately force someone – perhaps workers, perhaps
consumers -- to bear the resulting cost, and it is quite possible that the adjustment will
swallow the redistributive effect, perhaps through changes in the rest of the wage
package. Significant distributive changes should not be expected from switching default
rules in labor and employment law.
We have also seen the possibility that the endowment effect reflects no real
difference in terms of welfare under different default rules, but something about the
different bargaining situations in which owners and buyers find themselves.
Nonetheless, I have suggested several grounds on which a switch in the default rule
might be justified. Sometimes such a switch will produce relatively clear improvements
in terms of workers’ welfare. If, for example, the consequence of the switch is to
increase savings without produce any real harm, the new default rule seems to produce
an unambiguous improvement. More controversially, I have suggested that a switch
might be justified because of its desirable effects on individual and social valuations of
the rights at stake. This is a more controversial basis for a choice of default rule. But in
some cases, at least, it seems the only basis on which the choice might be made.
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